STIX
Socratix Holdings Limited  ·  BVI Co. 2122340  ·  www.stix.co
Last updated: July 2026
• INVESTOR ALERT •
Taranveer Singh Sabharwal
Taranveer Singh Sabharwal aka Taran
Founder & CEO  ·  Socratix Holdings Limited
$4M+RAISED
15+INVESTORS CHEATED
2024LAST REPORT
BRIEF

Brief

Every fraud begins the same way: with trust.

“I would honestly rather go broke than steal. Never try to scam someone. You will never be able to look yourself in the eye again and karma will destroy you in the future.”

TARANVEER SINGH SABHARWAL (AKA TARAN), PUBLIC POST, MONTHS AFTER HE STOPPED ANSWERING HIS OWN INVESTORS’ CALLS — 1

That's the same man fifteen-plus investors trusted with more than US$4 million.2

Between 2023 and 2025, investors funded STIX, an OTC marketplace for illiquid crypto tokens.3 What they were never told was that, alongside STIX, Taran was building a separate investment fund that bought and sold the same assets STIX brokered for clients—effectively trading as principal against the same market.4

Internally, he acknowledged the conflict more than a year earlier. Rather than shutting it down, he decided to continue.5

Investor reporting deteriorated. Financial statements never arrived. Meaningful updates stopped. At the same time, Taran asked, in writing, for his real financial numbers to be kept out of investor reporting. Not omitted by mistake. Requested.6 The fund itself was backed by investors he never identified, using capital whose origin he never disclosed.6

The company wasn't understaffed. Taran told Investor 1 that his own employees—Alex Siu, Jeff Lavoie and Vivek Prasad—“literally run the business without me.”7 Whatever prevented investors from receiving straight answers, it wasn't that nobody was home.

It wasn't one investor being ignored. Communication stopped with all of them. Emails went unanswered. Calls were missed. The entire management team fell silent.7 Investor 1 eventually warned: “You'll hear from all of us acting as a group soon.”7 This website is that group speaking. When Taran resurfaced over a year later, it wasn't with answers. It was to ask how the family was doing.8

The updates never came. The promised conversion never happened.9

While investors waited for answers, Taran publicly discussed a US$20 million investment into a quantum computing company,10 claimed a 300× return on Anthropic,11 promoted a hypercar investment fund,12 and warned others about founders “rugging left right and centre.”1 He had plenty to say publicly—just nothing to say to the people who had financed STIX.

Between 2023 and 2025, STIX continued raising capital through successive financing rounds at progressively higher valuations—US$18 million, then US$35 million, and finally US$100 million.9 Investors were repeatedly told their SAFEs would convert once the Series A closed. Instead, another SAFE was issued at the same US$100 million valuation cap, while the earlier SAFEs remained outstanding. Years later, investors still held no shares and had received no substantive explanation for why the promised conversion never occurred.9

Viewed in isolation, each event might be explained away. Together, they form a single pattern: investors funded one business while something materially different was built alongside it. Communication stopped when questions became unavoidable. The SAFEs never converted. The explanations never came.13

What that money ultimately funded looks less like an OTC brokerage than a personal investment operation built alongside it.13

This wasn't a startup that quietly failed. It was concealment, self-dealing, and sustained silence over nearly two years.

Call it what it is: fraud.

WHO IS TARAN AND WHAT IS STIX

Taranveer Singh Sabharwal, known as Taran14, is a Cambridge physics graduate, and committee member of the Cambridge Blockchain Society15. He identified a specific problem in the crypto market: trading in locked or illiquid tokens was fragmented, conducted through informal back-channel deals, with no standard pricing or process.² His stated solution was STIX16 — a professional over-the-counter marketplace for these transactions.³

The concept addressed a genuine market need at the time. As token vesting schedules became longer and larger amounts of capital remained locked, founders, employees, venture investors and funds increasingly sought liquidity before tokens became freely transferable.17 Secondary transactions were becoming an established part of the digital asset ecosystem, yet they remained largely relationship-driven and opaque.18 A professional marketplace for these transactions was, on its face, a credible and commercially attractive proposition.19

STIX is the commercial brand. The legal entity behind it, and the counterparty on every investment agreement referenced in this website, is Socratix Holdings Limited, a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands.20 Investment contracts define "the Business" narrowly: the conducting of secondary-market over-the-counter cryptocurrency and virtual-asset transactions.21

Taran founded and led the company throughout the period covered by this website. He is referred to as Taran throughout; Socratix and STIX are used interchangeably to refer to the company, consistent with how the company refers to itself in its own materials.22

TEAM

STIX presented itself, throughout the period covered by this website, as a staffed operating company rather than a solo venture. Its public team page and LinkedIn materials identified named personnel across institutional sales, compliance, operations, engineering, and product - including Alex Siu23, Jeff Lavoie, CFA24, Vivek Prasad25, Will Clemente26 and Soeleen Kaur27. In October 2024, Taran told Investor 1 directly that the business no longer depended on him personally: "Alex, Jeff and Vivek literally run the business without me," adding that key-man risk was "mostly gone."

This detail becomes relevant later. Once investor communications stopped, the company was not, on this record, short-staffed or without active personnel — a fact that bears on how any subsequent silence toward investors should be read.

THE STORY

TIMELINE

THE SEED ROUND AND EARLY DAYS

Q2 2023: $2.7M seed round. Big Brain, Eterna Capital, Fisher8, TLF, Humla Ventures come in alongside.28 At least eight investors invested in Socratix Holdings Limited through SAFE agreements during the seed round.29 Investor 1 invested US$500,000 through a SAFE at a US$18 million post-money valuation cap. Days later, Investor 2 invested US$100,000 on the same terms.30 The agreements included on this website are the executed agreements signed during the seed round.30 All of the SAFEs provided for automatic conversion only if the company later completed a priced financing raising at least US$5 million.30

Investor 1 signed the SAFE on 2 May 2023. The same day, Taran signed a side letter containing additional commitments regarding future activities and conflicts of interest.29

ORIGINAL SAFEs

THE PROMISE

Before taking the money, Taran signed a personal side letter with the lead investor. 2 May 2023. In it, he personally undertook: "not to carry on the Business unless such Business is conducted through the Company or a 100% direct or indirect subsidiary entity of the Company." The Business was defined as "the business of conducting secondary market over-the-counter cryptocurrency and virtual asset transactions." Not a company promise. His name. His signature.30

SIGNED UNDERTAKING

By August 2023, the team was real and growing. Jeff Lavoie joined as Head of BD — "psyched to have him on, really well connected in the US." 31Days later, asked for a quarterly update, Taran reported a team of eight: CEO, Head of Legal & Compliance, Head of Business Development, Senior Associate, Senior Product Engineer, Senior Frontend Engineer, Frontend Engineer, DevOps Engineer.32 A real company, with a real org chart. That's part of what made the later silence so hard to square — this wasn't a one-man shop that could plausibly go quiet because the founder got overwhelmed.

Throughout 2024, numbers were reported as growing. Investors were kept updated. No formal financials were ever shared. The last investor report they'd ever receive was the Q4 2023 report, published 29 January 2024. 33No financial statements. No revenue figures. No balance sheet. Market commentary, dressed up as an update. Nobody was asking hard questions yet.

Except someone already was. Three months after the seed closed — 27 July 2023 —Investor 1 confronted Taran directly: "this is the ninth time in the past three weeks that you have promised to call me and blown me off. That is both terribly unprofessional on your part and even more disrespectful to me, both as an individual and considering that I am the managing partner of your lead investor."34

INVESTOR UPDATE
EXHIBIT 5Investor 1 raises concerns about the fund and SPVs

August 2023

VIEW ORIGINAL ↗

Investor 1 traced his concerns to discussions surrounding the proposed investment fund involving Ana, an individual involved in discussions relating to the fund structure: "it started around the same time as the issues with the 'fund' creation with Ana (and now the concerns have extended to the SPVs, if what Ana says is true)."35

Side vehicles. Undisclosed SPVs. The whole pattern this page documents — visible within ninety days of the money landing.

On 17 January 2024, another SAFE was executed at a US$35 million valuation cap.36 More than 90% higher than the cap the first two investors got, eight months earlier, for the identical instrument and identical conversion terms.37

SAFE
EXHIBIT 6SAFE — Investor 3

$200,000 · $35M valuation cap

OPEN DOCUMENT ↗

THE FIRST WARNING SIGNS

Throughout 2024, Taran remained in regular contact with investors.38 Updates were reported as positive, and STIX maintained an active public presence39 — press appearances, podcast interviews40, and frequent posts on Twitter. No formal financial statements were shared during this period, but investors had, on this record, no immediate cause to press the point.

In the fourth quarter of 2024, Taran circulated a Series A deck to investors — the last formal document they would receive.41It disclosed, for the first time, a planned STIX Asset Management arm: a structure exceeding $50 million in AUM, with deal-specific SPVs, a multi-strategy fund, and a proprietary trading desk, operating under the same brand as the OTC platform investors had funded.

Investor 1 raised the conflict directly at this time — running an investment fund alongside a client-facing brokerage, under one name, using the same relationships and deal flow. Taran acknowledged the concern. The plan proceeded regardless.42

On 6 February 2025, Taran told Investor 2: "Our company is doing very well! We're just closing our A at 100m, 5x+ from the seed."43 What closed on 15 March 2025 was, on its face, a further SAFE instrument — not a certificate of issued shares. Whether that financing met the contractual definition of an Equity Financing cannot be resolved from the document alone.44

THE PARALLEL FUND

By late 2024, the fund described in the Series A deck was already operating. In private Telegram messages exchanged with Investor 2 on 25 October 2024, Taran said it had raised approximately $4 million toward a $5 million target, with 30 percent carry and no management fee.45Asked how STIX clients viewed the fund, he said "they all love it." Asked whether STIX's own clients were aware of the fund, he replied: "None."

He described the fund's purpose directly: "an experimental vehicle to operate as a principal buyer of secondaries," with a projected cashflow of "5+m per month." 46He disclosed, informally, that STIX had generated $1.3 million in transaction fee revenue and $500,000 in OTC trading revenue — figures that had not appeared in any report to investors.47 Asked whether the fund's assets sat on STIX's own balance sheet, he replied:48

"Yes. The company you invested in lol."

TARAN, TELEGRAM, REPLYING TO INVESTOR 2, WHO ASKED WHETHER FUND ASSETS SAT ON THE COMPANY'S OWN BALANCE SHEET — 25 OCTOBER 202448EXHIBIT 10 · · VIEW ORIGINAL TELEGRAM

Taran acknowledged, in the same conversation, that he had recognized the conflict of interest more than a year earlier: "We initially thought of the conflict last July. And decided not to do it. That was a mistake."49

Asked directly whether running a fund alongside a client-facing brokerage would "get weird at any point," he said it would not: "Sellers love that we're also now buyers."50 He described using the fund to trade as principal against the same order flow STIX brokered for clients: "If we predict someone's gonna buy something at 1.3x in 3 months and it's available rn for 0.8x, we are happy with the duration risk."51 When the arrangement was compared to Arthur Hayes's conduct at BitMEX, he replied:

"Haha yeah but far less degen."

The fund subsequently participated in Neutrl's US$5 million financing round52 , a company that publicly appeared closely associated with STIX and Taran. Public materials created the impression that Taran had played a significant role in the company's formation. STIX investors were not informed that fund capital was being deployed into these investments, nor were they provided with updates regarding the fund's activities.

PUBLIC RECORD
EXHIBIT 13Neutrl financing and STIX involvement

2025

VIEW ORIGINAL ↗

and investments in Ethena Labs53, Spectral Labs, Space and Time, Capx AI, and the Shiba Inu ecosystem via Treats for Shib.54 These deployments appear to have occurred through a vehicle outside Socratix Holdings Limited, with no disclosure to the investors who had funded the parent company — a fact that bears directly on the side letter discussed earlier.

PUBLIC RECORD
EXHIBIT 14Fund portfolio and deployments

2025

VIEW ORIGINAL ↗

A STIX team member separately described Neutrl, a recipient of the fund's capital, as "a growing client of STIX's on the buy side" in a public thread, while disclosing his own personal position in the same token.55

PUBLIC ACTIVITY WHILE INVESTORS WAITED FOR ANSWERS

Throughout this same period, Taran maintained a visible personal investment profile. He stated he had invested over $20 million in Quantinuum, describing it as "my largest single investment" and,56

separately, as "my largest private stock holding after anthropic." He said he was "up 300x" on a position in Anthropic.57

Weeks earlier, mid-way through the silence with his own investors: "Selling anthropic (250x). Buying x (predicting 5 to 25x).58

He proposed pooling US$50 million among contacts to acquire hypercars, offering to personally contribute US$10–15 million.59

On 14 June 2026, posted publicly that "lawsuits are at an ATH in crypto" and that founders were "rugging left right and centre." The observation came from the same person who, by that date, had gone roughly eleven months without answering his own lead investor, and had provided no financial reporting to his investors at any point in the preceding year.60

PUBLIC POST
EXHIBIT 19“Lawsuits are at an ATH in crypto”

14 June 2026

VIEW ORIGINAL ↗

Taken together, the pattern described in this page — an undisclosed side fund, personal investments across quantum computing and AI, a proposed hypercar pool, all funded or maintained during a period of total silence toward the company's own investors — resembles something closer to a personal investment operation, financed in part by capital raised for an OTC brokerage, than a startup that simply stopped communicating.

THE COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN

Investor communication did not end overnight. It deteriorated gradually.

Throughout 2025 and into 2026, investors across the group repeatedly attempted to obtain basic information about the company they had funded. Emails were sent. Calls were requested. Telegram messages continued. On several occasions, Taran responded. What never arrived were the promised documents, financial information or substantive updates regarding the business itself.

On 25 July 2025, Investor 1 sent a formal letter after nearly a year without a meaningful update.

FORMAL LETTER
EXHIBIT 20Letter from Investor 1 to Taran

25 July 2025

VIEW ORIGINAL ↗

The letter recorded that Taran had agreed to meet in Dubai but the meeting never took place. It also noted that investors had learned about the STIX fund through media coverage rather than from Taran directly. It concluded:

“Your lead investor is unhappy and has done absolutely nothing to justify such deliberate, long-term isolation.”

INVESTOR 1, FORMAL LETTER TO TARAN — 25 JULY 2025 · EXHIBIT 20 49

Taran did not respond to the letter itself. Hours later, he sent a Telegram message saying that he had travelled to India because of a family emergency and would follow up “this weekend.” No substantive follow-up was provided.

On 9 November 2025, Investor 1 wrote again, describing the continuing lack of engagement as “completely irresponsible, unprofessional and disrespectful.” Again, no response addressed the underlying issues.

On 23 November 2025, Investor 1 referred back to an earlier message in which Taran had said he would never forget his day-one investors and asked:

“What happened to that sentiment?”

INVESTOR 1, EMAIL TO TARAN — 23 NOVEMBER 2025 · EXHIBIT 20 49

On 16 February 2026, another email followed, noting that even “the courtesy of a reply would be appreciated”—four months on. There was no substantive reply.49

Then, after roughly eleven months without meaningful contact, Taran messaged Investor 1 on 28 March 2026 to ask how he was doing. The message did not contain a business update, financial information or an explanation for the prolonged lack of communication. Investor 1 replied directly, saying he understood why Taran was suddenly back in touch after almost a year of silence toward his own investors.61

Taran's response consisted of three brief messages, ending with:

“What a terrible message to send. All the best…”

Investor 1's final reply stated that the investors would now proceed together as a group.61

By early 2026, the pattern extended beyond a single investor. Investors across the group had sent emails, requested calls and asked for basic reporting. Some outreach was acknowledged. Meetings, documents and future updates were promised. None resolved the underlying questions.62 No investor contributing to this site had seen Taran in person for an extended period, despite multiple agreed meetings in Dubai with Investor 1. A Dubai address associated with him was visited by Investor 1 and appeared unoccupied at the time of the visit.63

Shortly afterwards, the STIX platform displayed only an “Under Maintenance” page. No explanation was published. No timeline was provided. No message was issued to investors or clients.64

WHERE DO WE STAND NOW (JULY 2026)

Investors have still not received the promised financial information, a substantive explanation of the investment fund, confirmation of the status of their SAFEs, or a clear account of what became of the business they financed. Meetings were promised. Updates were promised. Documents were promised. None arrived. The STIX platform remains unavailable, and investors continue to rely on public posts and third-party reporting for information that should have come directly from the company.

After years of assurances, repeated promises and prolonged silence, the investors believe they were deliberately misled. They do not regard what happened as a failed startup or poor execution.

They regard it as fraud.

STIX website under maintenance
STIX platform under maintenance, 2026.

  1. Public post by on X (formerly Twitter), published in or around July 2026, stating: The statement was published during a period in which multiple STIX investors were alleging prolonged non-responsiveness and seeking basic company information. See also Exhibits 19 and 45.↩︎

  2. STIX publicly announced a US$2.7 million seed financing involving institutional venture investors and angel investors, describing the capital raise as funding the development of its institutional OTC marketplace for locked digital assets. See Yahoo Finance announcement and related company announcements. See also Exhibit 1.↩︎

  3. STIX website describing the company's OTC marketplace for secondary digital-asset transactions↩︎

  4. ​​https://cryptorank.io/funds/stix↩︎

  5. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 1, 25 October 2024. Discussing the principal-buying fund, Taran stated: "We initially thought of the conflict last July. And decided not to do it. That was a mistake."↩︎

  6. Telegram conversation between Taranveer Singh Sabharwal and Investor 1, 6 January 2025.↩︎

  7. Telegram conversations, emails and written correspondence exchanged between investors, Taran and members of the STIX team. The reviewed record shows repeated requests for meetings, financial reporting and substantive company updates during 2025–2026, together with prolonged periods without substantive responses. See also Taran's statement that “Alex, Jeff and Vivek literally run the business without me.”↩︎

  8. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 1, 28 March 2026,↩︎

  9. SAFE Agreements executed on 2 May 2023, 5 May 2023, 17 January 2024 and 15 March 2025, recording successive post-money valuation caps of US$18 million, US$18 million, US$35 million and US$100 million. Earlier SAFEs provided for conversion upon an Equity Financing; the materials reviewed do not show that the earlier instruments converted into shares.↩︎

  10. X post by Taran stating that he had invested more than US$20 million in Quantinuum, describing it as his "largest single investment" and, separately, as "my largest private stock holding after anthropic btw ;↩︎

  11. X post by Taran stating that he was "up 300x" on his investment in Anthropic↩︎57

  12. X post by Taran o establish a US$50 million hypercar investment pool, stating that he would personally contribute US$10–15 million↩︎

  13. See STIX Series A Investor Presentation describing the proposed expansion into asset management and operation as a principal buyer of secondary digital assets; Telegram conversations between Taran and Investor 1, 25 October 2024, discussing the fund structure, carried interest, and operation as a principal buyer.See Exhibits 4, 5 and 6↩︎

  14. https://www.linkedin.com/in/taranveerss/↩︎

  15. https://cambridgeblockchain.org/committee.html↩︎

  16. https://www.stix.co/↩︎

  17. See Keyrock, “From Locked to Liquidity: What 16,000+ Token Unlocks Teach Us”, analysing more than 16,000 token-unlock events and describing the scale, structure and market effects of long-term token vesting and unlock schedules.↩︎

  18. See STIX website and investor presentation describing the secondary market for locked digital assets as fragmented, relationship-driven and lacking standardised institutional infrastructure.↩︎

  19. See STIX website and investor presentation describing STIX as a professional over-the-counter marketplace intended to provide pricing, process and execution infrastructure for secondary digital-asset transactions.↩︎

  20. Certificate of Incorporation and corporate records for Socratix Holdings Limited, British Virgin Islands Company No. 2122340. Socratix Holdings Limited is the legal entity named as the company and contracting party in the investment agreements reviewed for this website.↩︎

  21. See SAFE Agreement between Socratix Holdings Limited and Investor 1, defining "the Business" as "conducting secondary market over-the-counter cryptocurrency and virtual asset transactions." See Exhibit 5.↩︎

  22. STIX website, investor presentations, and investment agreements, which use STIX as the commercial brand and Socratix Holdings Limited as the legal contracting entity. See↩︎

  23. https://www.linkedin.com/in/alexsiu1228/↩︎

  24. https://www.linkedin.com/in/jl-cfa-95ab8b25/↩︎

  25. https://www.linkedin.com/in/vivek-prasad-085792168/↩︎

  26. https://www.linkedin.com/in/will-clemente-81b0361a4/↩︎

  27. https://www.linkedin.com/in/soeleen/↩︎

  28. STIX, “STIX Raises $2.7M to Transform Secondary Markets for Digital Assets,” Yahoo Finance, reporting the US$2.7 million seed round and participation by Big Brain Holdings, Eterna Capital, Fisher8 Capital, TLF Ventures and Humla Ventures. Accessed 28 July 2026. ↩︎

  29. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 1, 1 May 2023, regarding execution of the SAFE documentation and Founder side letter, including the messages: "Sent safe over" and "Once signed, will send the 2 side letters over."Founder side letter executed on 2 May 2023. See Exhibit 9.↩︎

  30. Founder side letter executed personally by Taran on 2 May 2023 in connection with Investor 1's SAFE. The undertaking is separate from the SAFE itself and was signed by Taran in his personal capacity. It provides that he would not conduct “the Business” outside Socratix Holdings Limited or a wholly owned subsidiary. See also the SAFE definition of “the Business.”↩︎

  31. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 1, August 2023, announcing the appointment of Jeff Lavoie as Head of Business Development: "Psyched to have him on, really well connected in the US." See Exhibit 15.↩︎

  32. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 1, August 2023, providing a quarterly company update listing an eight-person team comprising the CEO, Head of Legal & Compliance, Head of Business Development, Senior Associate, Senior Product Engineer, Senior Frontend Engineer, Frontend Engineer and DevOps Engineer. See Exhibit 16.↩︎

  33. See STIX Q4 2023 Investor Report, distributed on 29 January 2024. The report contains market commentary, platform screenshots and operational discussion but no audited financial statements, profit-and-loss statement or balance sheet. No later investor report containing audited financial statements has been identified among the materials reviewed for this website.↩︎

  34. Telegram conversation between Investor 1 and Taran, 27 July 2023, in which Investor 1 complained of repeated missed calls, writing: "this is the ninth time in the past three weeks that you have promised to call me and blown me off..." See Exhibit 21.↩︎

  35. Telegram conversation between Investor 1 and Taran, 27 July 2023, in which Investor 1 referred to concerns regarding the creation of a separate "fund", a contact identified as Ana, and possible SPV-related issues: "...it started around the same time as the issues with the 'fund' creation with Ana..." See Exhibit 21.↩︎

  36. See SAFE Agreement between Investor 3 and Socratix Holdings Limited, executed 17 January 2024, documenting an investment at a US$35 million post-money valuation cap. See Exhibit 22.↩︎

  37. Comparison of the SAFE Agreements executed on 2 May 2023, 5 May 2023, and 17 January 2024. The first two investors invested at a US$18 million post-money valuation cap, while Investor 3 invested at a US$35 million post-money valuation cap. All three agreements used substantially the same SAFE structure and provided for conversion upon a qualifying Equity Financing. See Exhibits 8 and 22.↩︎

  38. Telegram conversations and email correspondence between Taran and investors throughout 2024 documenting regular communication regarding the company's activities. See Exhibits 23–24.↩︎

  39. Investor updates circulated during 2024 describing continued business development, commercial activity and company growth. See Exhibit 25.↩︎

  40. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C46BWtdI3J8↩︎

  41. STIX Series A Investor Presentation, circulated in Q4 2024. See particularly the Business Overview slide presenting “Secondaries Brokerage” and “Asset Management” as parallel business lines; the Core Team slide identifying the operating team; and the materials describing the use of institutional or LP capital to act as principal buyers of secondaries.↩︎

  42. Telegram conversation between Investor 1 and Taran, in which Investor 1 questioned the conflict of interest arising from operating an investment fund alongside a client-facing OTC brokerage under the same brand. See Exhibit 31.↩︎

  43. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 2, 6 February 2025, in which Taran wrote: “Our company is doing very well! We’re just closing our A at 100m, 5x+ from the seed.” See Exhibit 8 and the underlying message record.↩︎

  44. SAFE Agreement executed on 15 March 2025, documenting a US$1 million investment at a US$100 million post-money valuation cap. The instrument is, on its face, a SAFE rather than a certificate of issued shares. Whether it satisfied the contractual definition of an “Equity Financing” under the earlier SAFE Agreements cannot be determined from that document alone. See SAFE — Series A.↩︎

  45. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 2, 25 October 2024, describing the fund's structure, target size, carried interest and management fee. See Exhibit 36.↩︎

  46. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 2, 25 October 2024, in which Taran described the fund as "an experimental vehicle to operate as a principal buyer of secondaries" and projected cash flow of "5+m per month." See Exhibit 38.↩︎

  47. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 1, 25 October 2024, in which Taran disclosed approximately US$1.3 million in transaction fee revenue and US$500,000 in OTC trading revenue. The investor reports reviewed for this website do not contain these revenue figures. See Exhibits 20 and 39.↩︎

  48. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 2, 25 October 2024, in which Taran replied, "Yes. The company you invested in lol," when asked whether the fund's assets sat on STIX's balance sheet. See Exhibit 40. See also Exhibit 10 and the Series A Investor Presentation.↩︎

  49. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 2, 25 October 2024, in which Taran stated: "We initially thought of the conflict last July. And decided not to do it. That was a mistake." See Exhibit 41.↩︎

  50. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 2, 25 October 2024, in which Taran replied, "Sellers love that we're also now buyers," when asked whether operating a fund alongside a client-facing brokerage would "get weird at any point." See Exhibit 42. See also Exhibit 12.↩︎

  51. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 1, 25 October 2024, in which Taran described the fund's investment strategy: "If we predict someone's gonna buy something at 1.3x in 3 months and it's available rn for 0.8x, we are happy with the duration risk." See Exhibit 43↩︎

  52. https://www.coindesk.com/business/2025/04/16/neutrl-raises-usd5m-to-tokenize-a-popular-hedge-fund-altcoin-trade↩︎

  53. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/ether-based-crypto-dollar-issuer-133213141.html↩︎

  54. https://cryptorank.io/funds/stix↩︎

  55. Public X post by [Will Clemente] describing Neutrl as "a growing client of STIX's on the buy side" and disclosing a personal investment in the same token. See Exhibit 45.↩︎

  56. Public X posts in which Taran stated that he had invested more than US$20 million in Quantinuum, describing it as “my largest single investment” and separately as “my largest private stock holding after Anthropic.” See Exhibit 15 and the captured tweets.↩︎

  57. Public X post in which Taran stated that he was “up 300x” on an investment in Anthropic. See Exhibit 16 and the captured tweet.↩︎57

  58. Public post made during the period of investor silence stating: “Selling anthropic (250x). Buying x (predicting 5 to 25x).” See Exhibit 17 and the captured post.↩︎

  59. Public post proposing a US$50 million pooled vehicle to acquire hypercars, with Taran offering personally to contribute approximately US$10–15 million. See Exhibit 18 and the captured post.↩︎

  60. STIX Series A Investor Presentation, Q4 2024, particularly the Business Overview slide. The presentation presents “Secondaries Brokerage” and “Asset Management” as parallel STIX business lines and describes more than US$50 million in AUM, deal-specific SPVs, a multi-strategy fund, and the use of institutional or LP capital to act as principal buyers of secondaries. See the full presentation in Other Materials.↩︎

  61. Telegram conversation between Taran and Investor 1, 28 March 2026, following approximately eleven months without substantive communication. The exchange begins with Taran asking how Investor 1 was doing. Investor 1 replied that he understood why Taran was suddenly back in touch after almost a year of silence towards his own investors. Taran responded with three brief messages, ending: “What a terrible message to send. All the best…”. See Exhibit XX.↩︎

  62. Email correspondence between Investor 1, Taran and other investors during 2025–2026, documenting repeated requests for financial information, company reporting, meetings and business updates. The correspondence records acknowledgements, promises of future updates and proposed meetings, none of which resolved the outstanding issues raised by investors. See Exhibits XX–XX.↩︎

  63. Documentary material relating to the proposed meeting between Taran and Investor 1 in Dubai, together with supporting evidence regarding the Dubai address associated with Taran following the cancelled meeting, including contemporaneous photographs and communications. See Exhibits XX–XX.↩︎

  64. Screenshot of the STIX trading platform (app.stix.co), displaying only an “Under Maintenance” page, with no accompanying explanation, investor communication or public timeline for the platform's return. Accessed 28 July 2026. See Exhibit XX.↩︎

  65. Telegram conversation dated 25 October 2024. When the arrangement was compared to Arthur Hayes’s conduct at BitMEX, Taran replied: “Haha yeah but far less degen.” See Exhibit 12 and the underlying Telegram record.↩︎65